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Abstract The postponement of childbearing is occurring across Europe, but the
paths of this trend differ profoundly from country to country. In Poland, as in other
Central and Eastern European countries, most women have their first child at a
relatively young age. This article asks about the role of age norms in sustaining the
pattern of early motherhood. We investigate young adults’ perceptions of age in
relation to their fertility choices. We find that age is, indeed, a salient dimension that
structures and regulates individual childbearing plans. The qualitative approach of
our study allows for gaining insights into how age norms are explained, argued
about and sanctioned. Finally, we reconstruct the mechanisms of the normative
influence of age limits (deadlines) on fertility behaviour, improving our under-
standing of the timing of childbearing.
Keywords Fertility postponement  Age norms  Post-socialist countries 
Poland  Qualitative interviews
Re´sume´ Le report de la procre´ation s’observe a` travers l’Europe, mais les ressorts
sous-jacents a` cette e´volution diffe`rent conside´rablement d’un pays a` l’autre. En
Pologne, de meˆme que dans d’autres pays du centre et de l’est de l’Europe, la
majorite´ des femmes ont leur premier enfant a` un aˆge relativement jeune. Cet article
se penche sur le roˆle des normes d’aˆge dans le maintien de la maternite´ pre´coce. La
mise en relation des perceptions de l’aˆge et des choix procre´atifs des jeunes adultes
nous a permis d’e´tablir l’importance de la dimension de l’aˆge dans la structuration
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et la re´gulation des choix individuels en matie`re de procre´ation. L’approche qual-
itative de notre e´tude fournit un e´clairage sur la manie`re dont les normes d’aˆge sont
explique´es, argumente´es et approuve´es. Enfin, nous reconstruisons les me´canismes
de l’influence normative des aˆges limites sur le comportement procre´atif afin de
mieux comprendre le calendrier de la procre´ation.
Mots-cle´s Report de la fe´condite´  Normes d’aˆge 
Pays post-socialistes  Pologne  Entretiens qualitatifs
1 Introduction
Even though women enter motherhood at increasingly later ages in all European
countries, the postponement of childbearing does not occur at the same pace across
the continent. The process started particularly late in the post-socialist bloc, clearly
triggered by the breakdown of the previous political and economic regime around
1990. It is commonly agreed that economic change was the main force driving
demographic change in this region (e.g. Aassve et al. 2004; Frejka 2008; Lesthaeghe
and Surkyn 2002; Philipov 2003; Sobotka 2004). In the face of massive inflation,
high unemployment and growing competition in the labour market, young people in
the Central and Eastern European countries choose to postpone marriage and
childbearing as obtaining a diploma or professional qualification, and then finding a
job, are of primary importance, and precede family formation.
Postponement of childbearing appears to be a rational answer to rapid social and
economic changes that induce high levels of uncertainty amongst young people.
Nonetheless, not all women in the post-socialist region adopt this strategy. In fact,
within this group of countries big discrepancies exist in relation to fertility timing,
and some countries adopt the patterns of late childbearing extremely reluctantly.
Some of them (e.g. Estonia) have reported even a decline in the age at first
childbearing in the first years of the economic transformation. In years 1990–2004,
women’s mean age at first birth increased by 3.2–3.8 years in Hungary, Slovenia
and Czech Republic, but only by up to 1.5 year in Romania and in the majority of
former Soviet Union countries (Council of Europe 2006). Moreover, even though
the tempo of fertility postponement in Central and Eastern Europe is, in general,
relatively rapid, the gap between this region and other parts of Europe remains
substantial. Whereas, in many European countries, the mean age of women at first
childbearing is approaching 30 (e.g. 29 in Germany, 28.9 in The Netherlands, 29.2
in Spain, 29.3 in Switzerland; Council of Europe 2006), in the Central and Eastern
European countries it still varies from about 23 to 26 years, with Slovenia being a
remarkable exception at 27.5 (Council of Europe 2006). It is not at all certain
whether women in post-socialist region will eventually be entering motherhood as
late as their counterparts in other regions of Europe.
Whereas a substantial amount of research has been dedicated to understanding
why women delay childbearing, relatively less has been done to comprehend the
forces that might impede this process, especially in the context of Central and
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Eastern Europe. Consequently, the understanding of changes in timing of
childbearing in this region is still incomplete. Our study helps to fill this gap by
investigating the role of norms in limiting fertility postponement. We locate our
research in Poland, a post-socialist country, where marked postponement of
childbearing has been observed only very recently. We employ a qualitative
methodology to explore young adults’ perception of age in relation to their fertility
choices. Based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews, conducted with young men
and women in Warsaw around 2004, we investigate how age norms are explained,
argued about and sanctioned. Our analyses aim at understanding the mechanisms of
the normative influence of age limits (deadlines) on fertility behaviour.
2 Polish Case: Timing of Transition to Parenthood
Although Poland records one of the lowest fertility levels in Europe (TFR of 1.2–1.3,
Central Statistical Office 2008), the postponement of childbearing there has been
relatively modest so far, especially during the first decade after the collapse of
communism. Between 1989 and 1999, women’s mean age at the first birth increased
by only one year in the country (from 23.3 to 24.4; Council of Europe 2006). In the
following 5-year period, the growth was more marked, as the women who decided to
postpone childbearing in the era of the most drastic economic and social changes,
started to enter motherhood. They still, however, have their first children much
earlier than their counterparts in other parts of Europe. In 2004, when the qualitative
part of our study was conducted, women’s mean age at first birth reached a value of
25.6 in Poland (ibid).
Figure 1 depicts the age distribution of first births in 1989, 1999 and 2004. We
can see that from 1989 to 1999, it did not change much, whereas the pattern in 2004
is, indeed, remarkably distinct. The numbers of first births amongst women in the
younger age groups (under 24) clearly declined. At the same time, relatively more
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Fig. 1 Distribution of first births (%) by the age of the mother, selected years, Poland. Source: Central
Statistics Office. Note: Central Statistical Office changed the definition of ‘live birth’ in 1994. Therefore,
compared to years 1999 and 2004, data from 1989 underestimate the number of live births by about 2,000
in total for all birth orders and all ages of mothers. If we consider that in 1989 there were over 560,000
births recorded, we trust this does not impact the overall picture
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births occurred to women 26 or older, although the increase for those over 32 is not
large. Although the process of fertility postponement is more advanced in urban
areas, even there the transition to motherhood is rare over this age limit (see Fig. 2).
Kurkiewicz and Fra˛tczak (2006), who analysed age-specific first-birth rates,
reached a similar conclusion: the number of first births has decreased substantially
for the 20–24 age group, with some sign of recuperation in later ages. This
recuperation, however, takes place mainly under the age of 30: birth intensities for
older age groups are still very low (ibid). In fact, in Poland the vast majority of first
births occur to mothers aged 20–30. As many as 91.3% of women, who started their
reproductive career in 2004 were 30 or younger. Another 4.4% were aged 31–32,
and only 4.3% of first births occurred to mothers age 33 or older (Central Statistical
Office 2005). For comparison, in 1989, as many as 93.7% of women having their
first child were 30 or younger, another 2.6% were aged 31–32, and 3.7% entered
motherhood at age 33 or older (Central Statistical Office 1999). The number of
women, who become mothers over the age of 33, has not increased meaningfully.
The shift in age ‘‘stops’’ at the early thirties and this limit seems to be (at least for
now) impassible.
The above tendency has been also reconstructed by individual level data. Ola´h
and Fra˛tczak (2006), using the 2001 Polish Retrospective Survey, calculated the
relative risks of transition to parenthood for Polish women, who were still childless
at age 25. Naturally, the results show that the intensity of first birth decreases as age
increases. This trend, however, is not statistically significant up to age 30 and then
becomes significant. In other words, if a woman does not have a child by the time
she is 30, the chances of her becoming a mother later substantially decline.
As in other post-socialist countries, in Poland fertility postponement is mainly
associated with consequences of the transformation (Kowalska 1999; Kotowska
1999a; Kurkiewicz and Fra˛tczak 2006; Rajkiewicz 2004). With the collapse of the
previous political and economic regime, the state lost its protective role. In the
market economy, the relationship between the state, the business community and
individual households changed, and household welfare became more dependent on
the personal income, skills and abilities of household members (Kotowska 1999a,
b). At the same time, the radical transformation of the economy altered the Polish
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Fig. 2 Distribution of first births (%) by the age of the mother, selected years, Poland, urban and rural
areas. Source: Central Statistical Office. Note: On data comparability—see note to Fig. 1
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labour market completely and introduced a new phenomenon: unemployment. The
job market became insecure in general, and it is particularly difficult for women:
many studies and reports show that all economic and institutional changes in Poland
affect women more than men (e.g. Budrowska 2004; Bystydzienski 2005;
Graniewska 2003; Gucwa-Les´ny 2002; Kozek 2002). Not only are women at
higher risk of being jobless than men but they are also more likely to suffer from
long-term unemployment. In addition, even though legal regulations protect
working mothers in Poland, reconciliation of motherhood and employment is not at
all easy. A woman’s position is protected starting with her pregnancy: employers
cannot dismiss a woman who is pregnant (after the third month of pregnancy), or
who takes maternity or parental leave. Some studies, however, show that not all
employers comply with the above regulations in practice (ASM Centrum Badan´ i
Analiz Rynku 2006; Mynarska 2009). Furthermore, not all women can afford to
take an unpaid parental leave. Maternity leave of 16 weeks is fully paid, but if a
woman wants to stay at home and care for a child longer, her family must live on the
man’s income only. Child-care benefits are very low, and they go only to the poorest
families, while formal care for children ages 0–3 is practically non-existent in
Poland (only about 2% of children ages three and under are cared for in nurseries;
Fra˛tczak et al. 2007).
All the above aspects lead to postponement of family formation in Poland.
Women want to complete their education and to be well-established in the labour
market before they marry and enter motherhood1 (Kotowska 1999a; Kurkiewicz and
Fra˛tczak 2006; Matysiak 2009). And, achieving this goal and a successful work and
family reconciliation are highly difficult. However, all things considered, it remains
difficult to understand why fertility postponement in Poland has not been more
rapid. In the 15 years following the collapse of the communism regime, women’s
mean age at first birth increased by 2.3 years in Poland, while in countries like
Hungary, Slovenia or Slovakia it rose by 3.2–3.8 years.
Clearly, economic transformation takes place in all post-socialist countries, but
patterns of childbearing postponement (as well as of other fertility- and family-
related trends; Hoem et al. 2009) differ remarkably across the region. Sobotka
(2004), who investigated fertility trends in Central and Eastern European countries,
hypothesized that the persistent early childbearing in some of them can paradox-
ically be linked to a less successful economic transformation. He shows that the
countries, where the decline in real wages in years 1989–1999 was the largest, are
also those where fertility postponement did not occur rapidly, if at all (see Fig. 3).
In the countries where the market is particularly tough, where women have little
chance of finding a job and their income is low, they may choose to become mothers
at an early age. They might not see many benefits from postponing family
formation, since regardless of their education, experience and skills, they have poor
prospects in the labour market (cf. Sobotka 2004). Some recent studies conducted in
1 Fertility and nuptiality trends are closely related in the Polish context. Timing of marriage and of
childbearing change simultaneously and a very similar set of factors influence the decision to marry and
have children (Fra˛tczak 1999; Kotowska et al. 2008).
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eastern and western Germany suggest that such a mechanism is indeed plausible
(Bernardi et al. 2006; Kreyenfeld 2005).
This explanation, however, does not seem to hold for the Polish case. First, as
Fig. 3 depicts, Poland is an outlier. While the drop in real wages was rather modest
there, fertility postponement was not marked. In other words, Poland is similar to
the Czech Republic or Slovenia as far as change in real wages is concerned. In terms
of the shift in women’s mean age at first birth, however, Poland resembles the
countries where the consequences of economic transition were (at least initially)
more severe, for instance Romania, Latvia or Bulgaria.
Second, if early childbearing was associated with the poorest job prospects,
fertility postponement would not occur amongst women with low education, but
rather amongst those with a university degree. Such a situation seems to occur in
Germany, where ‘unemployment strongly defers fertility plans among the highly
educated women (…). For women with a ‘‘Realschulabschluss’’ (medium level), the
subjective feeling of economic uncertainty plays a rather insignificant role’’
(Kreyenfeld 2005, p. 25–26). Also, for the Czech Republic, Kantorova (2004) shows
that after 1990 women with higher education do not enter motherhood immediately
after they complete their education, and that they wait longer than their less
educated counterparts. This does not happen in Poland. In general, Polish women
with higher education enter motherhood later than those with low education
(Table 1), but there is no clear sign of fertility postponement for this group. Unlike
in the Czech Republic, a large majority of them still become mothers soon after
completing their academic education. The highest share of first births occurs
amongst women aged 25–29, whereas in a regular path students finish university at
age 24.2 The clearest patterns of fertility postponement are evident for women with
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2 In Poland, until recently university education was exclusively single-stage and lasted 5 years. Currently,
two-stage university programs are gaining an increasing popularity, which may—paradoxically—slow
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secondary, post-secondary (not university) and basic vocational education (see
Fig. 4).
All things considered, economic and institutional changes can explain fertility
postponement in Poland, but we still do not understand what forces held back this
process, at least initially. We believe that cultural background should be considered
in that respect. While the economic and political system in Poland was transformed
basically overnight, culture is more resistant to change. Scholars universally agree
that the impact of ideational factors needs to be carefully considered when analysing
reproductive behaviours. Especially in the post-socialist context, values and beliefs
may interact with economic and political changes in numerous ways (Thornton and
Philipov 2009).
Polish culture is marked by a strong orientation towards family and children and
Catholicism, and its most distinct feature is religious homogeneity. According to the
Table 1 Median age of mothers at first birth by education level, Poland, 2004
Mothers’ education level Primary Basic vocational Secondary Post-secondary Tertiary
Median age of mother at first birth 19.7 23.3 24.3 25.5 27.7
Source: Central Statistical Office 2005
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Footnote 2 continued
down the fertility postponement for women with tertiary education. Women who complete only the first-
level studies finish education at age 21–22.
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Central Statistical Office, at the end of 2004 more than 34 million Poles, or about
90% of the total Polish population, belonged to the Roman Catholic Church (Central
Statistical Office 2006). Poles are also relatively religious. In fact, as far as the
ideational dimension is concerned, Poland in many respects resembles other
Catholic and religious countries (e.g. Italy, Ireland) more than the other post-
socialist ones (Siemien´ska 2004). This is crucial if we consider that religious belief
may strongly influence individual life choices in relation to family and children.
Importantly, the Catholic Church condemns extramarital sex, modern contracep-
tives, abortion, and divorce.
Polish society is not only strongly religious but also very family oriented.
Consistently, family and childbearing are found to occupy the very highest positions
in the individual value systems of Poles (e.g. Fra˛tczak and Balicki 2003; Giza-
Poleszczuk and Poleszczuk 2004; Ogryzko-Wiewio´rowska 2001; Sufin 1999).
Finally, religious belief and a strong orientation towards family and children are
also accompanied by rather traditional attitudes towards marriage and gender roles.
Poles continue to define a woman’s role in a quite a traditional way: she is, above
all, a mother, and her sphere of self-realisation is the household and childcare
(Budrowska 2004; Mandal 2004; Philipov 2008; Ruckdeschel 2008).
Generally, the cultural heritage of Poland encourages childbearing. Nevertheless,
the above aspects of Polish culture—Catholicism, high value of family and children
or traditional gender roles—protect parenthood, but do not have a direct impact on
timing of childbearing. Therefore, in our study, we investigate whether young Poles
perceive any culturally defined deadlines or norms related to parenthood. Some
studies suggest that such deadlines may play an important role in limiting fertility
postponement. Research shows that the delay in childbearing is more marked when
having children later in life is culturally approved (Morgan 1991). It has also been
argued that flexible and loose age norms are some of the reasons for the changes in
the timing of childbearing (Castro Martin 1992; Rindfuss et al. 1996; Settersten and
Haegestad 1996). Therefore, it seems justified to suspect that the sustained patterns
of early childbearing are supported by more universal and strict age norms. In fact,
some evidence of that has been already presented for other post-socialist countries.
Perelli-Harris (2005) used data from focus group discussions to illustrate how
traditional norms foster early childbearing in Ukraine and Potancˇokova´ (2009), in
her qualitative study on Slovak women, finds that age norms are relevant for their
reproductive choices. This is the path we follow in our study as well.
We showed that after the change of regime, women’s mean age at first birth in
Poland increased, but not as steeply as one might have expected. The more rapid
fertility postponement started only recently and it mostly concerns women with a
medium level of education, living in urban areas. Moreover, the shift in women’s
mean age at transition to motherhood is mostly due to a concentration of first births
in the 24–29 age group. Generally, the share of first births to mothers older than 32
is marginal, and has not increased substantially since 1990.
While economic and institutional factors are considered to be responsible for
fertility postponement, we seek to understand the role of cultural factors in
impeding this process. In particular, we ask whether there are any culturally defined
and socially controlled rules (norms) that encourage early parenthood or that set any
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age limit for having a first child. We will examine whether young people consider
any deadline for the transition to parenthood and how it impacts their reproductive
choices.
3 Qualitative Approach: Method and Sample
In this study, we conducted problem-centred interviews (Witzel 2000) that combine
methodological openness in data collection with a specific theoretical focus on one
or more topics. Our interview guideline covered six topical areas, providing rich
information on the history of the respondents, on their current situation as well as
their desires and intentions, with a special focus on the family sphere. In particular,
the interview included (1) a retrospective biographical narrative of the respondent
up to the moment of the interview as well as his or her current life situation; (2) the
union history and the status of the current relationship; (3) the fertility history and
the current desires and intentions related to childbearing and parenthood; (4) the
experience of being a parent and the associated value-orientations; (5) the impact of
the political and economic transformation of the early 1990s on the respondent’s
family and fertility plans; and (6) plans and fears related to future life course
development. The analysis for this article mainly draws on the information gathered
on fertility histories, as well as on fertility desires and intentions.
The study took place in Warsaw at the end of 2004 and in the beginning of 2005.
We interviewed 48 individuals: 26 women and, in 22 cases, also their partners.
When it was possible to interview both partners, each of them was interviewed
separately. Women’s ages ranged from 20 to 30 and men’s from 20 to 35. A
majority of the respondents were childless, only 14 of them (seven couples) had one
child. Marital status of the respondents varied: 26 were married, 11 were cohabiting
and 11 were dating or did not have any partner at all. Our respondents varied also in
regard to their education. Two educational subgroups were defined: up to high
school graduation (20 respondents with primary, vocational, secondary professional
or secondary general education) or higher (28 respondents with Bachelor’s or
Master’s degree, or still studying). Almost all our respondents (except 5 men) were
born in Warsaw or moved there in their childhood (before the age of 15).
Our sample was purposively selected, including people living in the capital city
and better educated than the Polish population overall. As shown in the previous
section, this is the group that enters parenthood the latest: their behaviour sets the
frontiers of fertility postponement. Therefore, this group is particularly interesting
for our research purposes: if we identify age norms related to childbearing that
impact the fertility choices of our respondents, it is highly probable that such norms
have an even more powerful influence on people living in rural areas and on the less
educated (in line with the diffusion theory; Rogers 1995).
The analysis of the data is modelled on the coding procedures of the ‘grounded
theory’ approach, as outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998; cf. Glaser and Strauss
1967). During the interview, respondents talked about their experiences, desires and
intentions regarding childbearing. Using these narratives, first of all, we identify all
passages related to age and childbearing desires or intentions. Within this material,
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using the procedure of open and axial coding (‘‘bottom-up’’ coding; Straus and
Corbin 1998), we categorize and define the different ways (and the reasons) our
respondents considered age with regard to their planned timing of parenthood.
The richness of the textual data allows us to study, in detail, the relation between
age norms and other aspects of fertility choices; and enables us to reconstruct the
various mechanisms of the normative impact of age. The qualitative procedure we
employ is well-designed for studying the age norms in two more respects. First, our
respondents are asked widely about determinants of their fertility choices but not
directly about the role of age. Therefore, we are able to evaluate the subjective
importance of age deadline for individuals. Second, norms are usually supported by
mechanisms of social control: negative sanctions in the case of deviance and
positive enforcements for compliance (e.g. Blake and Davis 1964; Ensminger and
Knight 1997; Marini 1984). In many cases, however, people do not readily portray
their personal choices as being shaped by the opinions of others. Thus, an in-depth
interview may also allow the investigator to capture very subtle effects of social
influence.
Our results are presented as follows. First, we portray how the interviewees
perceive and reason the age deadline for the transition to parenthood. Second, we
look at the mechanisms of social control over this deadline. Next, we consider how
strongly it can influence individual fertility choices. Finally, to complete our
investigation on the regulating power of norms, we explore whether any exceptions
are acceptable and, if so, under what circumstances.
4 Results: Does Age Matter?
4.1 Age Deadline for Parenthood
In our study, we ask the respondents what aspects should be taken into consideration
when planning a child. We do not ask directly about the age issues in any way,
therefore it is quite striking that the majority of respondents spontaneously come up
with the concepts of ‘age’, ‘time flying’, ‘getting old’, or (at the other end of
continuum) ‘still being young’. Amongst the interviewees, 30 report that they are
considering, or have considered in the past, some form of age deadline for having
their first child. It is also remarkable that almost all childless women in the sample
report some form of time pressure for becoming a mother, with just three
exceptions: the youngest female in the sample (20 years old), and two women
undergoing gynaecological or infertility treatment (they are aware that with time
their chances of becoming pregnant are decreasing, but in their narratives, they do
not refer to any particular deadlines). Amongst those who did not mention the
ageing aspect are some childless men, as well as respondents already with a child (in
most cases, unplanned).
For those who speak of time pressure, the most frequently perceived deadline is
age 30. This age appears in the interviews with women as well as with men,
although it is mostly (but not exclusively) given in relation to the age of a female
partner. This deadline is mentioned explicitly (‘I would like to have a child before
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I’m 30’) or implicitly (‘It’s high time, I’m 28’). It is in some cases perceived as a
strict upper limit (‘I want to have a child before 30’) or as a vaguer point of
reference (‘Maybe about 30?’). In some cases, the deadline is set lower: for
instance, at the age of 25. The maximum limit that appears in our data is 32, but it
is not given as a single point but as an upper limit of a range: ‘I think, it will be
30–32’. In general, the clear message is: one should not delay the transition to
parenthood for too long. Our respondents give several explanations as to why one
ought to have children at a young age. We identify seven main categories of
reasons, as presented in Table 2.
Not surprisingly, the age deadline is most strongly connected to biological and
health aspects: a female’s optimal age for childbearing and her fertility limits. We
make a distinction between these two reasons because they differ in their relation to
age and in their weight. As far as a woman’s optimal age for childbearing is
concerned, if respondents define it at all, they suggest the mid-twenties (24–26).
They reason that this time of life is the best, but they do not mention any
consequences of having a child outside this ‘‘best period.’’
The argument related to fertility limits is much stronger. The substantial
postponement of childbearing is perceived as a threat, with the risk that women will
have problems getting pregnant and delivering a baby or even that they will
eventually remain childless. Our respondents clearly do not want to be responsible
for such an outcome (‘…later, I don’t want to blame myself’). Notably, although the
argument related to fertility limits appears in the interviews with male as well as
female partners, women emphasize it much more strongly. This is their biological
limitation, and they are more worried about it. Moreover, the issue of fertility limits
is not mentioned in relation to men at all.
The opinion that postponement beyond age 30 can lead to childlessness is in most
cases given as an undisputable fact, which does not require any additional
explanation (see Table 1). However, it is also sometimes supported by experiences
of friends or by doctors’ opinions:
This topic comes up. They feel obliged to have children before 30, or some of
them are trying and it takes time and it’s worrying, or it needs some medical
tests. So I hear about things like this… (Female, 28, childless)
My last visit to the gynaecologist ended up with some comment that gave me
lots to think about: that one cannot postpone it till ‘nobody knows when’. It’s
time to consider it. I keep telling myself that I am still young—that’s OK, but
it does not translate into biology. (Female, 29, childless)
The deadline of age 30 is sometimes explained also in relation to the limits of
completed fertility. If one wants to have more children, the first one needs to be born
early. However, this is mentioned only in a very few cases. Moreover, wanting to
have more children neither push the deadline for the first one forward to earlier ages,
nor does a desire to have just one child make our respondents more relaxed about
the age limit. In fact, a woman who gave the lowest deadline of her transition to
motherhood (25 years) definitely wants to have only one child. Nevertheless, since
the vast majority of interviewees want to have two children, there is not enough
variety to compare this issue in closer detail.
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Whereas the above reasons for early childbearing relate only to the women’s
ages, there are also explanations that apply to both men and women. For instance,
younger parents will have more energy and patience for a child and better relations
with offspring. They will also be still young and full of energy for ‘enjoying life’ or
Table 2 Categories related to the explanations of the age deadline for parenthood
Name of category Description Example
Health and
biological
clock—fertility
limits
For women the postponement of
childbearing beyond the age of 30 is a
threat that they will have problems with
getting pregnant.
‘‘I’m at that age and later I don’t want to
blame myself that I’m not able any
more [to have a child]. That we put the
decision off for too long and that I go to
a doctor and he says: I’m sorry, your
time is up, and now you have to try hard
or spend a lot of money so that you can
have a baby. So I don’t want to let it
happen’’ (Female, 29, childless)
‘‘I’m simply aware that I’m getting older
and older. Such postponing… later and
later… and then it is too late at the end’’
(Female, 25, childless)
Health and
biological
clock—optimal
time
For women, there is a biologically
optimal age for having children.
‘‘And after all M. (wife) is at the best age
to have a child now, 24–26 years old, so
we also consider the medical aspects’’
(Male, 25, childless, wife 25)
‘‘It is best to deliver a child between 20
and 30, and even better up to 25’’
(Female, 22, childless)
Energy and
patience for a
child
Having children at an older age means
less energy and patience for a child.
‘‘I would like to be still fit. To play [with
a child], go somewhere, go cycling,
play football or something. When
you’re older, you don’t feel like doing
that. One prefers to rest, to lie down’’
(Male, 28, childless)
Age distance—
relationship
with a child
Older parents have a worse relationship
with their children, especially during a
child’s adolescence.
‘‘[When people] plan to have a child
when they are 30, in my opinion it’s
terrible. I mean terrible for a child,
because a child is born, grows up and
parents are old people already. And they
have or they might have worse contact
with a child’’ (Male, 29, 1 child)
Mixed social
roles
Having children at an older age results in
being a parent and a grandparent at the
same time.
‘‘I am 28. I don’t want my child to call me
grandpa’’ (Male, 28, childless)
Nothing more to
expect of life
afterwards
Having a child at an older age means that
when a child is grown up, parents will
be too old to do other things with their
lives or proceed with a career.
‘‘I always think about the stage, I think,
when a child is 15 years old, how old I
will be, so I would still have a life!’’
(Female, 25, childless)
Not able to have
a second child
Waiting too long with the first child
means less time to manage the second
one.
‘‘If I had a first child in a couple of year’s
time, when I’m about 30, then… for a
second child one also needs a couple of
years and it is too late then!’’ (Female,
25, childless)
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to proceed with their own career when a child has grown up. Finally, having a child
at an older age results in a situation of family roles being mixed: one can be taken
for a grandparent of one’s own child.
4.2 Social Control
Our respondents do not report much direct social pressure connected to the age of
childbearing. Data do not reveal any socially imposed sanctions for having a child
over the age of 30. Only one category of explanations, related to the mixed social
roles of late parents, can be regarded as (to some extent) connected with a
mechanism of social control: being labelled as a grandparent of one’s own child
may lead to an embarrassment in front of others (‘I don’t want to be a grandpa when
I take my child to school’). Some direct pressure to have children at a young age
may come from gynaecologists. This, however, appears only in two interviews, and
only in one case seems to have a real impact.
However, although there is little evidence of strong direct pressure with regard to
the age of childbearing, powerful pressure and numerous mechanisms of social control
exist when it comes to having a child in general. Presenting all the factors that influence
childbearing intentions would extend beyond the scope of this article. However, a high
regard for having children in the individual value system of Poles (Fra˛tczak and
Balicki 2003; Giza-Poleszczuk and Poleszczuk 2004; Ogryzko-Wiewio´rowska 2001)
is clearly sustained also by social norms and a complex system of sanctions and
rewards. Childlessness is clearly not an acceptable option here. In Polish society,
everybody ought to become a parent and some examples of mechanisms of social
control over this norm are presented in Table 3. It is striking that punishment for
childlessness (even unintended!) can be as severe as being left by a partner.
The pressure to have a child is combined with a great concern, described before,
that the postponement of childbearing over the age 30 may ultimately lead to
childlessness. Thus, we may say that there is no strong direct social control over the
age at first birth, but there is an indirect one, as illustrated by Fig. 5.
Women may neither expect nor fear any social sanctions for having a child after
they are 30. They do, however, anticipate severe consequences if they are not able to
have a child afterwards. As a result, chronological age not only provides a point of
reference for fertility choices; we are also able to document the relatively strong
regulating power of the perceived age deadline for parenthood.
4.3 Regulating Power of Age Norms: Impact on Fertility Choices
To begin with, we consider how young people consider and deal with the age limits
when they plan their family. The interview data show that when a woman
approaches 30, this topic becomes highly relevant for her. As a vivid illustration of
this, we can consider one female respondent, still childless at age 29. She feels
exceptional pressure to get pregnant in the following year. However, her partner
wants to wait, saying that he is not ready for a child yet. Thus, she is almost certain
to miss the deadline of 30. There are several remarkable features of her ways of
dealing with and talking about this situation.
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First of all, she mentions almost all possible reasons for having a child as soon as
possible. In general, for all interviewees, we identified seven main explanations of
the age deadline (compare Table 1). In her narrative, as many as five of them are
present (fertility limits, optimal time, patience to deal with the demands of a child,
relationship with a child and mixed social roles):
I’m at that age and I don’t want to blame myself later that I’m not able any
more [to have a child], that we put the decision off for too long and that I got
to a doctor and he says ‘‘I’m sorry, your time is up’’ (…) there’s a period in
Table 3 Social pressure for having children: examples of the categories related to the mechanisms of
social control
Name of category
Examples
Description Example
Social disapproval or pity
(sanction)
Childless people are perceived as
egoistic, strange and disturbed
(when they do not want to have
children) or unhappy and sad (when
they cannot have children).
‘‘She is somehow abnormal,
degenerate; she doesn’t want to
have children, horrible!’’ (Female,
24, childless)
‘‘I know two couples, of my parents’
age, who don’t have children. And
this is really sad, depressing. I think
such people become freaks’’
(Female, 29, childless)
Direct pressure from
family
Family directly communicates
encouragement to have children or
disapproval for not having one.
‘‘The parents, especially mine, are
saying that we should have a baby.
My mum says: I’m retired now, so I
would have something to take care
of after’’ (Female, 26, childless)
Loss of a partner
(sanction)
Not wanting (or even not being able)
to have a child is a sufficient reason
for a partner to leave.
‘‘If she didn’t want to [have children],
I think… it would end up in
breaking up’’ (Male, 28, childless)
‘‘If we tried all options and didn’t
succeed [to have a child], if he
wanted to leave, I would let
him….’’ (Female, 29, childless)
Social exclusion
(sanction)
Not having children is related to
being an ‘‘outsider’’: losing friends,
being treated as a strange person.
‘‘People around you set up their
families, they are happy about their
children, they have their
problems… and you sit there on
your own and it doesn’t concern
you’’ (Female, 28, 1 child)
Childbearing—giving
status of a mature
person (positive
reinforcement)
Childbearing is positively reinforced
by giving a new social status to
parents.
‘‘They would look at me as a mature
woman because I am over 18, but I
think that in their opinion… I don’t
know if they treat me completely as
a child but surely not like a mature
woman, maybe fifty-fifty. But when
someone has a child (…) then it’s a
symbol that she is a mother. so she
is a responsible and mature person’’
(Female, 22, childless)
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which women should get pregnant and give birth (…) the child is healthy then
and the woman is all right too, and everything is just fine. And then I’m not a
mum and grandma at the same time and the relations with the child are all
right too, they are not out of balance, as when I’m 50 and my daughter is 15 or
10 because I was a mummy who had her child very late, and then everything
irritates me. (Female, 29, childless)
Not only does she present these arguments in the interview, but they are also her
weapon to convince her partner (‘He knows exactly, and I always make him aware
of it, that I’m at my age…’). She urges him to think that childbearing is important
now, and although she claims that she does not want to ‘force him’, she also says:
You probably have to persuade the man, so he realizes that if we want to be
together and set up a family at some time, then we should think about it
earlier, in order not to blame ourselves later. Because I wouldn’t like to regret
and reproach P. [partner] for waiting too long and that there is a problem.
On top of that, she has also stopped taking the pill, leaving the issue of
contraception completely to her partner.
This particular case of disagreement in a couple is quite extreme compared to
other respondents in our sample. Naturally, as we indicated before, as the woman’s
age is the key criterion, the pressure is stronger for a female than for her partner.
The woman is also frequently the one who brings up the topic. However, with most
couples in our sample, with time, the male partner is increasingly concerned with
the age issue, too. Hence, a consensus in a relationship is usually found.
Older respondents not only start to perceive age-related aspects as more important
for their fertility plans, but they also tend to evaluate them as more influential than
other issues. Interestingly, this relates also to material factors, which are universally
perceived as a crucial reason for postponing the reproductive decision. A place to
live, a job, and money are frequently mentioned as the prerequisites for having
children—and the absence of them leads to a delay in childbearing. Still, this
importance apparently loses its power as the age deadline approaches.
One should have a child
A woman should deliver her first 
child before she is 30
Having a child over 30:
Difficult / impossible delivery -
risk for child’s / mother’s health,
problems with raising a child 
(less energy, worse contact)
Mechanisms of social control: 
Social pressure, sanctions, positive 
reinforcements 
Fig. 5 An indirect mechanism of social control over the age deadline for parenthood
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A baby requires large financial expenditures and I’m just postponing it… not
yet, not yet. Some dates are being mentioned: in a year’s time. Because I’m
getting close to the round age and I need to take that into consideration too
(…) I’m going to make this decision anyway when I’ll be getting close to 30,
no matter what our financial situation is. It will cease to be a problem then.
(Female, 27, childless)
The same mechanism works in the next example of the couple who, just a few
weeks before an interview, made a decision to start trying to conceive:
I wanted to put it off for some time until some financial things are clarified.
But M. [partner] is right too, saying that in one year’s time there will still be
some reasons not to do it anyway and to postpone it further. We don’t want to
end up in our thirties and still planning and it would be perhaps too late.
(Male, 25, childless)
Interestingly, for women the age-related pressure can be so powerful that it
triggers considerations for and planning of childbearing, even if there is no clear
desire to become a mother! Consider the following quotes:
I don’t think about a child, because I want to have a child. Only… I’m almost
30 and for me this is a kind of magic number. Because I think one has to have
a child eventually (…) And this is rather the reason why I think about children,
not that I would like to have kids so much now or that I have so strong a
maternal instinct. (Female, 29, childless)
I hope that I’ll live till I’m 50 years old and I would like to have a grown-up
child who would come and talk, who would help me or whom I would help or
a family relationship. Since I want to have it at that time I need to start trying
now. This is not yet a wish to have a child. I don’t feel this need yet (…) but
let’s say that you need to have your first child before you turn 30, so I have a
few more years. Well, but it could also appear that it’s not so easy, right?
(Female, 25, childless)
These examples show the importance of a perceived age deadline: It clearly has
an impact on individual considerations and behaviour. The norm seems relatively
powerful. Another indicator of the strength of a norm is its inflexibility. The more
rigid a norm, the fewer the deviations that can be accepted, and the greater the
rationalization required in the case of deviant behaviour (Blake and Davis 1964;
Nydegger 1986). We shall conclude our results by examining in what situations
missing a deadline for parenthood is justified.
4.4 Inflexibility of Norms: Justified Exceptions
It is noteworthy that our respondents do not report any desire to postpone
childbearing over the age of 30. They do not perceive any benefits of it. They can
imagine only three situations in which one could have a child later than age 30. All
of them are considered outcomes of external circumstances.
366 M. Mynarska
123
The first situation is infertility or infecundity, as long as it is not related to the
woman’s age but rather to some congenital condition, an illness or an accident. If a
woman has problems with conceiving at a later age, she might blame herself (or
possibly also be blamed by others?) for not having tried to get pregnant when she
was younger.
The second situation when it is justified to miss the deadline for parenthood
relates to the lack of a (‘right’) partner:
I was talking to some single people… I have a colleague, she is older than I
am, and she has a very strong need to become a mother, but she has no way.
(Female, 28, childless)
Notably, the lack of a partner is treated here as (again) an external circumstance,
not as a conscious choice. If a woman decides to remain single, she meets
disapproval, as for instance, in the following example of the respondent, who speaks
of her single friend:
She is partying and so on, but I don’t envy her and I think it is not right, it is
not a good way [of living]. (Female, 28, 1 child)
Health problems and an involuntary lack of a partner are independent of an
individual’s will. In these cases, not only the substantial postponement but also
ultimate childlessness could be justified. Nevertheless, it still can lead to some
social sanctions, as we discussed previously (compare Table 2).
The third and most complex reason for which it seems acceptable to postpone
childbearing until a later age is a difficult financial situation:
[My wife] often mentions that she would like to have children and that she’s
running out of time, but at this very moment there’s no such chance. Well,
most of all—there are no financial resources (….) That holds us back. This
issue most of all: finance. (Male, 30, childless, unemployed, wife: 29)
Apparently, the relation between age and the material situation gets even more
complex. On the one hand, the normative power of an age deadline for childbearing
may influence the subjective evaluation of available resources (Sect. 4.3). On the
other hand, a lack of financial means may act as a justification to postpone
childbearing, even beyond the age of 30. Thus, a question arises: What level of
economic resources is perceived as sufficient for childbearing, and what level is still
unsatisfactory? Are there any economic conditions that would justify childlessness?
Apparently, the answer to the latter question is negative.
These are temporary arguments. Because of that everything is delayed for us
too. But it can’t be a reason for a final decision. It’s—like my mother usually
says—when there is food for two people, it would be enough for a third one.
So it’s not that, I don’t know what kind of conditions you would have to have
so that genuinely you couldn’t afford to have a child. Besides, you read that
some people are raising their children despite their very difficult situation.
(Female, 25, childless)
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The interplay between age and economic aspects seems a key for defining a time
of first childbearing.
5 Age Norms and Fertility Postponement: Summary and Discussion
Our study captures Poland at a very interesting moment, when fertility postpone-
ment has just started to increase its pace. Lots of research has been dedicated to
understanding what drives this process, but much less has been done to comprehend
the forces that might be holding it back. Our study contributes to filling this gap. We
explore how cultural factors foster early childbearing. In particular, we ask about
age norms, culturally defined deadlines for parenthood, and their role in that respect.
Our analyses show that age is a salient concept, important for fertility planning.
Our respondents frequently and spontaneously referred to age when talking about
experiences or intentions related to the transition to parenthood. They also reported
a distinct pressure for having their children at a relatively young age. The most
commonly mentioned deadline for entering parenthood is age 30, and it mostly,
although not exclusively, refers to the age of a woman. The explanations given for
this deadline are consistent with those already found in the literature (Perelli-Harris
2005; Potancˇokova´ 2009; Settersten 1999; Settersten and Haegestad 1996): the
strongest argument relates to the biological clock of a woman and the limits of her
fertility. Our data show that these concerns do have an impact on individual fertility
choices. Importantly, we find a particularly strong tension between economic
aspects and the biological clock. On the one hand, people want to settle down on the
labour market, they want to be financially secure, they want to have a place to live
and they try hard to achieve it (see also Mynarska 2006). Therefore, a lack of
sufficient financial means is given as a reason for fertility postponement. On the
other hand, as a female partner gets older, her fertility limits dominate consider-
ations about motherhood. Consequently, frightened at the prospect of ultimate
childlessness, individuals start minimizing the importance of money. Age deadlines
are defined and sanctioned to protect childbearing that is highly valued in Polish
culture. Economic and cultural factors jointly shape patterns of timing of
motherhood.
In our respondents’ perspective, the age limit is associated most of all with
biological aspects. Yet, we argue that this is a culturally defined norm that acts here.
First, based on the qualitative data, we were able to identify the mechanisms of
social control over the age of first childbearing, even though they do not operate
directly. Second, deviant behaviours are rationalized and the acceptable explana-
tions are connected to external factors, beyond individual control. These aspects
indicate the existence of norms (Blake and Davis 1964; Ensminger and Knight
1997; Marini 1984; Nydegger 1986). Furthermore, there are no reasons to believe
that biology works differently for Polish than, for instance, Spanish or German
women. Still, in Spain and Germany women have their first child much later. Thus,
it is not the biological clock itself but rather the culturally defined and socially
sanctioned prescriptions and proscriptions which define at what age one should
enter motherhood.
368 M. Mynarska
123
This is clearly evident if we relate our findings to those of Perelli-Harris (2005)
for Ukraine or of Potancˇokova´ (2009) for Slovakia. Ukrainian and Slovak women
also express disapproval of late motherhood. They defend their position using
basically the same set of explanations, as we find in our study. They also most
commonly name the same deadline: 30 years of age. Nevertheless, meaningful
differences between the three settings occur. Whereas our Polish respondents
believe that the best (optimal) time to have a child is in one’s mid-twenties, in
Ukraine, a woman who has her first child at 25 is already considered an ‘old birther’.
In the Slovak study, a shift to later ages is observed. Medium to highly educated
women, living in Bratislava ‘think that having a child before age 25 is rather
irresponsible’ (Potancˇokova´ 2009, p. 149), and as for biological constraints, a
deadline of age 35 is also given. Apparently, in the three settings slightly different
age preferences and age limits are mentioned, although the same arguments are used
to explain them.
Importantly, even if we consider one country only, different deadlines for
parenthood might be revealed. Sobotka (2004) finds that age-heterogeneity in first
birth timing is increasing in European countries and ‘implies a widening
stratification between different social groups’ (Sobotka 2004, p. 228). This finding
supports our viewpoint that it might not be the biological age itself, but its culturally
defined meaning, which is important for fertility planning. And, this meaning may
vary for different social strata.
Our respondents set the frontiers of fertility postponement. They belong to the
social group that enters parenthood the latest (urban, tertiary education) and for
which fertility postponement has been particularly marked (urban, secondary
education). If in these groups age norms remain influential, as shown in this study, we
may suspect that they would be even more powerful in rural areas and amongst lesser
educated people, since according to Rogers (1995), any new ideas and behaviours are
expected to diffuse faster in more liberal urban settings and amongst highly educated
people. We do not know, however, whether the deadline of age 30 would be valid for
all social strata. It is possible that in rural areas respondents would give even lower
age limits for entry into parenthood. In order to fully understand age norms related to
parenthood, further research is needed on more heterogeneous samples. Such studies
could also help to explain where the differences in age limits come from. We
concluded that the same arguments are given to justify different age preferences and
deadlines for parenthood. The reasons for these discrepancies are, however, not clear.
They might be related, inter alia, to differences in availability of and attitudes
towards assisted reproductive technology (ART) and to the quality of the health care
system. Importantly, in Poland ART techniques are very expensive, and there is
heated public debate about the moral aspects of such practises. In particular, the
Catholic Church is strongly against in vitro fertilization. This method is perceived as
unnatural and the Church condemns the destruction of some of the human embryos
developed in the course of this procedure. In order to fully understand what defines
age limits for parenthood, doctors’ recommendations and media influence should
also be considered. Such studies, however, are scarce.
Certainly, more investigation is needed to understand the meaning of age and to
comprehend the relation between age norms and economic conditions for different
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social groups and in different contexts. The next years will show whether age norms
are losing their power in Poland or whether, instead, deadlines will shift to later
ages, but stay influential. If age norms are very rigid, as our study suggests, it is also
plausible that entry into motherhood over the age of 30 will remain extremely rare.
Nevertheless, women living in rural areas and with lower education might start
adopting the behavioural strategies of their more educated counterparts. In fact, the
more evident postponement amongst women without a university degree (see
Sect. 2) might be because they have more ‘space’ to delay childbearing; they are
still quite far from the normative deadline. Thus, the current age-heterogeneity in
first birth timing might be temporary. In fact, Kohler et al. (2002, p. 669–670)
suggested a pattern of ‘concentration of fertility into a more narrow age interval’, as
women are reaching the biological limits of childbearing postponement. For our
respondents, the age of around 30 marks such ‘biological limits’.
Our study contributes also to the general discussion on age norms. It does so to a
relatively limited extent, as we focus here only on the deadlines, and do not discuss
the lower limits of childbearing. Nevertheless, even in this narrow scope, we clearly
find age norms to be highly relevant for behavioural choices, at least in the case of
fertility choices of Polish respondents. Importantly, our results indicate that the
regulating power of age norms changes with time: the closer the perceived deadline,
the more relevant it becomes for a decision-maker. This finding should be taken into
account in further studies.
Our study also shows that the mechanisms of social control over compliance with
age norms might be indirect and thus probably more difficult to capture by
researchers and by respondents themselves. People are not necessarily aware to
what extent and in which ways their life is influenced by culture and society at large.
They may fail to observe or refuse to acknowledge this impact, especially if they
value highly their independence and freedom of choice.
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